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ARE THE WELFARE STATE AND RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM INCOMPATIBLE?

THOMAS

C. BERG*

I. THE WELFARE STATE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATIONS

Is the welfare state compatible with religious freedom? It is perhaps
understandable

that some

conservatives

and libertarians

answer

that

question "No." Many of today's high-profile disputes over religious
freedom involve social-welfare legislation whose restrictions clash with
religious tenets. Perhaps most prominent is the federal mandate on
employers to cover contraception in their health-insurance policies, which
triggered more than 100 lawsuits from for-profit and non-profit employers'
and a major Supreme Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc..2 The mandate stems from the Affordable Care Act's policy of
providing a guaranteed package of coverage in employer plans and in
policies on the government-subsidized health exchanges.
Another key recurring conflict is between non-discrimination claims by
same-sex couples and religious-freedom claims by those who object to
facilitating same-sex relationships: adoption agencies that decline to place
children in same-sex families, photographers who decline to photograph
same-sex weddings, and so forth.3 These cases arise in part because of the

&

* James L. Oberstar Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of St. Thomas School of Law
(Minnesota). O 2014 Thomas C. Berg. The article is based on a presentation at the Journal of
Law and Public Policy's January 31, 2014 symposium, "Regulating the Free Market." Unless
otherwise indicated, this article is current as of the end of 2014. Developments in this increasingly
prominent field move too fast for updates to maintain full currency. The issues here are discussed
more fully in Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J. L.
GENDER 103 (2015).
1. See HHS Mandate Information Central, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (cataloging 105 cases as of April 7, 2015, and
archiving documents from them).
2. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
3. For descriptions of the range of issues and varying views on them, see DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK ET AL., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008);
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expanding class of entities subject to anti-discrimination laws. Those laws
have always aimed to ensure the access of vulnerable groups to basic
services in society: to "public accommodations," originally defined as
hotels and inns, restaurants, theatres and other exhibition or entertainment

halls, and common carriers such as buses or trains. But more recently, the
term "public accommodation" has expanded to cover, in many states,
almost any entity that offers services or advertises to the general public.'
Oklahoma's law, for example, defines a "place of public accommodation"
in which various kinds of discrimination are forbidden as "any place, store,
or other establishment, either licensed or unlicensed, which supplies goods
or services to the general public or which solicits or accepts the patronage
or trade of the general public or which is supported directly or indirectly by
government funds." 6 Essentially the same definition in New Mexico's law
gave rise to the leading case involving a sole-proprietor photographer
declining to participate in a same-sex ceremony.
Unquestionably the expansion of social-welfare regulation creates new
conflicts with the free exercise of religion. Regulatory growth creates new
conflicts with constitutional rights in general. Courts have faced this tension
since the New Deal, when they largely gave up setting limits on
government's basic power to regulate the economy, whether those limits
came from economic liberties or from bounds on enumerated congressional
powers like the Commerce Power. Instead, as the famous footnote four of
the Carolene Products decision signaled in 1938,9 the courts permitted
general governmental power over the economy and turned instead to other

Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5
Nw. U. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 206 (2010); Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why Proposed
Exemptions to Equal Marriage Statutes Return Us To A Religious UnderstandingOf The Public
Marketplace, 5 Nw. U. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y. 236 (2010); Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, SameSex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. U. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 274 (2010).
4. This selective definition prevailed from the first public-accommodation laws, enacted in
the late 1800s, through the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., Justin Muehlmeyer, Toward a New
Age of Consumer Access Rights: Creating Space in the Public Accommodation for the LGBT
Community, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 781, 786-90 (2013).
5. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625-26 (1984) (noting the "expansive
definition" of public accommodations in "many states and municipalities"); Lauren G.
Rosenblum, Note, EqualAccess or Free Speech: The Constitutionality ofPublicAccommodations
Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1243, 1251 (1997) ("[T]he concept of 'public accommodations' now
sweeps well beyond the traditional category of inns, restaurants, and other common carriers,
reaching 'various forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct."') (footnotes omitted).
6. Okla. Stat. tit. 25, §§ 1402, 1401(1) (1987).
7. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2012) (quoting N.M. Stat.
Ann. 1978, §§ 28-1-2(H)); see also Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West Supp.
1997) () (prohibiting discrimination on a variety of bases "in all business establishments of every
kind whatsoever.").
8. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 375 (1990).
9. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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provisions that affirmatively barred certain government actions:
discrimination against racial and religious minorities, restrictions on
freedom of speech and on the right to vote, and so forth.10
With religious freedom, this countering strategy relied on
accommodations of religion: court rulings or statutory provisions saying
that otherwise valid regulations should not be applied in ways that
significantly burden the religious beliefs and practices of organizations or
individuals." The key constitutional decision was Sherbert v. Verner,1 2
issued in 1963 by the liberal Warren Court and written by its intellectual
leader, William Brennan. The Court ruled that a Seventh-Day Adventist
woman could not be denied unemployment benefits because of her refusal
to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. In so doing, the Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause required government to justify substantial burdens on
religious freedom under strict scrutiny, that is, with proof that the burden
served a compelling government interest and was the least restrictive means
of doing so. 1 3 Courts mandated accommodations in other cases too,
including Wisconsin v. Yoder,1 4 where the Amish objected to compulsory
schooling after age fourteen. And legislatures, which had included religious
accommodations in statutes since the beginning of the Republic-for
example, draft exemptions for pacifists-did so more and more as statutes
multiplied in the regulatory state." The Supreme Court shrunk
constitutionally mandated accommodations in Employment Division v.
Smith, 1 6 which upheld the application of criminal drug laws to Native
American believers who use peyote as a sacrament in worship.

10.

Among the many potential sources on this fundamental shift, see, e.g., ROBERT G.

MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 122 (Sanford V. Levinson rev. 2d. ed. 1994)

(describing the Court's shift from "the business-government problem" to "civil rights [i.e.] the
relationship between the individual and the government"); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 244 (U. Chi. Press. 1990) ("No

.

longer would the Court be much concerned with the controversies over social and economic
legislation ...
[but the Carolene Products footnote] suggest[ed] that the presumption of
constitutionality might have less force with respect to measures affecting specific guarantees .
[thus setting] the Court's agenda for the next fifty years.")
11. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992) (defining "accommodation" as
provisions "that have the purpose and effect of removing a burden on, or facilitating the exercise
of, a person's or an institution's religion"-that is, of "remov[ing] obstacles to the exercise of a
religious conviction adopted for reasons independent of the government's action").
12.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
13. Id. at 406-07 (requiring the state to show that a compelling interest justified a
"substantial infringement" and "that no alternative forms of regulation would combat [the
problem] without infringing First Amendment rights.").
14.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
15.
James E. Ryan, Note, Smith andthe Religious Freedom RestorationAct: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445-47 (1992) (noting that "religious exemptions exist in over
2,000 [federal and state] statutes").
16.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Accommodation, however, has continued through state statutes and
constitutional rulingsl7 and the 1993 federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA).18
Religious accommodations, which usually take the form of exemptions
from a law, are sometimes derided as anomalous or as contrary to the rule
of law.1 9 However, they are simply an instance of a familiar principle of
constitutional law: a law may be valid on its face and yet impinge on a
constitutionally protected interest in its application to a particular set of
facts. Religious accommodations are appropriate when a facially valid law
would, in a particular application, unjustifiably burden the free exercise of
religion. Whether an accommodation is mandated by a court or adopted by
the legislature, it is not lawless: in all such cases, a proper legal authority
determines that the accommodation either is required by an overriding law,
the Constitution, or should be included in a duly enacted statute or
regulation. Those same legitimate authorities also determine the
accommodation's proper scope.
Religious accommodation provides the means for balancing welfarestate regulation and religious freedom. It allows religious exercise to
remain free while the regulation accomplishes its goal in the vast majority
of cases. Accommodation tempers regulation without undoing it. Indeed,
accommodation often increases regulation's credibility, or its likelihood of
passage, by removing objections to it based on religious conscience. Samesex marriage provides an example. In three states that have recognized it
legislatively-New
York,
Maryland,
and Washington-proposed
legislation offering protection only to the clergy failed to garner enough
support to become law only months before revised bills passed. The fact
that same-sex marriage bills with more expansive protections were enacted
such a short time later suggests that exemptions mattered to the ultimate
success of those bills.2 0

17. See Juliet Ellperin, 31 states have heightened religious freedom protections, WASH.
POST,
Mar. 1, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/03/01/where-in-the-u-s-are-thereheightened-protections-for-religious-freedom/ (listing 18 states with versions of RFRA and 13
states with protective constitutional rulings). Subsequent enactments in Mississippi and Indiana
raised the number of state RFRAs to 20.
18.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1993).
19. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 886, 879 (describing constitutionally mandated
accommodations as "a constitutional anomaly" and as making the religious believer "a law unto
himself').
20. Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion,
Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REv. 1417,
1434-35, 1436-37 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (documenting the connection in detail). See
generally McConnell, supra note XX, at 694 ("If there were no accommodations, the underlying
legislation would become much more controversial and difficult to enact.").
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Nevertheless, accommodation has developed many opponents and
skeptics on both sides of the political divide. More and more voices from
the left reject virtually any religious-freedom exception from generally
applicable laws. In Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran School v. E.E.O.C.,21 the
Obama Administration argued, contrary to forty years of lower-court
decisions, that there should be little or no "ministerial exception" under the
Free Exercise Clause giving special protection to churches against suit.
Churches, the government essentially said, should possess only the kinds of
freedom of association claims that could be made by secular
organizations.2 2 (Strikingly, the government's argument lost in the Supreme
Court 9-0.23) The ACLU and other liberal civil-rights groups once counted
among the chief opponents of Employment Division v. Smith and
proponents of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.24 Now they oppose
many religious-exemption claims.2 5 They commonly argue that any time an
organization discriminates against employees or clients, or refuses to
provide them a statutory-mandated benefit, this constitutes an
impermissible harm to those parties and therefore may not be permitted by
a judicial or legislative accommodation.2 6
Conservatives now are much more likely to support religious
accommodation. But some on the right have been critical, or at least
skeptical, arguing that the only way to protect religious freedom is to
oppose the underlying welfare-state legislation, not to seek exceptions from
it. For example, some defenders of opposite-sex-only marriage laws deride
any possibility of a compromise that combines recognition of same-sex
marriage with protections for religious liberty. Matthew Franck writes that,
"[t]he preservation of meaningful religious liberty ... is inseparable from
the preservation, in our legal order, of the truth about marriage. They stand

21. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
22. Transcript of Oral Argument , Hosanna-Tabor,2011 WL 4593953 at 28 (Oct. 5, 2011)
(argument of Leondra R. Kruger, for the United States) ("The contours-the inquiry that the Court
has set out as to expressive associations we think translate quite well to analyzing the claim that
[the religious school] has made here. And for this reason, we don't think that the job duties of a
particular religious employee in an organization are relevant to the inquiry.").
23. Hosanna-Tabor, 123 S. Ct. at 706 ("We cannot accept the remarkable view that the
Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization's freedom to select its own
ministers.").
24. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV 839
(2014). Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1994) (both describing support for RFRA by
ACLU, People for American Way, and similar groups).
25. See, e.g., Using Religion to Discriminate, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/using-religion-discriminate;
26. A leading academic presentation of such arguments is Frederick Mark Gedicks and
Rebecca G. Van Tassell,
RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An
UnconstitutionalAccommodation ofReligion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014).
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or fall together."2 7 Likewise, Robert George has written that "[t]here was
never any hope of such a bargain [between marriage equality and religious
accommodation] being accepted," since for marriage equality proponents
'"full equality' requires that no quarter be given to the 'bigots' who want to
engage in 'discrimination' . . . in the name of their retrograde religious
beliefs."2 8 Thus, George has maintained that to defend religious freedom
rights for traditionalist institutions and individuals, the only hope is to
defeat same-sex marriage altogether: "there is no alternative to winning the
battle in the public square over the legal definition of marriage."29
More generally, Franck argues, "[t]he strategy of granting ad hoc
exemptions," although "appealing," is "constitutionally incoherent, and not
substantially improved by reliance on RFRA as a statutory basis,"3 0 He
argues that the only coherent approach is to treat the underlying coercive
law as invalid: for example, the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive
mandate "should not be a lawful command to anyone. Coverage of such
alleged 'preventive care' should return to being voluntary for all employers,
as it was in the past." 3 1

In this paper, I acknowledge and identify several ways in which
welfare-state regulation and its logic conflict with religious freedom. My
chief aim is to describe and defend how these tensions can be mediated
through accommodations. My discussion here is brief, and I give far from a
complete defense of accommodation against the various attacks on it. Even
less do I argue here why religious freedom should be a weighty
constitutional and legislative consideration in the first place. That is a
subject for other papers, both as to religious freedom in general3 2 and as to

27. Matthew J. Franck, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom, Fundamentally at
Odds, THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE (June 18, 2013), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com
/2013/06/10393/ ("After all, if redefining marriage to include same-sex couples accords with
justice and moral truth, there is no good reason for the new legal order to make room for
'conscientious' religious dissenters, for clearly their consciences are malformed and unworthy of
respect. Thus the fate of religious freedom, for scores of millions of Americans, stands or falls
with the fate of conjugal marriage itself"); Matthew J. Franck, Escaping the Exemptions Ghetto,
241 FIRST THINGS 21 (2014); Hadley Arkes, Recasting Religious Freedom, 244 FIRST THINGS 45
(2014).
28. Robert P. George, Marriage, Religious Liberty, and the "GrandBargain, " THE PUBLIC
DISCOURSE, July 19, 2012, http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/07/5884/.
29. Id.
30. Exemptions Ghetto, supra note 26, at 21,
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2014/03/escaping-the-exemptions-ghetto.
31. Id. See also Hadley Arkes, Recasting Religious Freedom, FIRST THINGS, June 2014, at
45, http://www.firstthings.com/article/2014/06/recasting-religious-freedom ("To the extent that we
cast our arguments along the lines of 'belief' and 'sincerity,' we can do no more than plead for an
exemption from the laws imposed on others. But again, that kind of argument distorts the truer
moral character of the argument we are making, for some of us truly see these mandates as
wrongful laws, which should be enforced on no one. We must recast the arguments that the
defenders of religious freedom have been making in the courts.").
32. For recent defenses of strong free exercise protections, see, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, THE

No. 2]

Are the Welfare State and Religious Freedom Incompatible?

177

the autonomy of religious institutions in particular.3 3 Here, I focus simply
on sketching how accommodation can mediate the tensions between
welfare-state regulation and religious freedom, and the extent to which
accommodation does-and does not-require adopting free-market logic as
against welfare-state logic. I make three major points.
II. POINTS ABOUT ACCOMMODATION

A. Accommodation Preserves the Underlying Law
The first point is simply to reiterate that accommodation does not
undermine the underlying law in question. The government can respect
religious freedom while applying that law in the vast majority of cases.
Accommodation thus provides the means for preserving meaningful
religious freedom in an age of active government.
Although accommodation involves limits on the sort of conduct
regulation that has been generally permitted since the New Deal,
accommodation is quite different from the intrusive judicial intervention of
the pre-New-Deal era. Decisions of that era denied Congress or states the
ability to regulate significant areas of the economy altogether. Under the
Commerce Clause, the pre-1937 Court barred Congress from regulating
employment conditions in most manufacturing industries on the ground that
they affected interstate commerce only indirectly.3 4 The substantive due

LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Harvard U.
Press 1998) (originalist and doctrinal defenses); JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR?
155-218 (1996) (doctrinal and jurisprudential defenses); Alan Brownstein, Justifying Free
Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 504 (2003) (doctrinal and jurisprudential defenses);

Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEG. Iss. 313 (1996) (originalist
and doctrinal defenses); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of

Free Exercise ofReligion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) (originalist defense); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 5 (2013)
(originalist and doctrinal defenses). My own contributions on this score include Thomas C. Berg,

Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103, 108-20 (2015);
Thomas C. Berg, Can Religious Freedom Be Protected As Equality?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1185

(2007).
33.
On religious institutional freedom, see, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT
INSTITUTIONS 174-193 (Harv. U. Press 2013); Alan Brownstein, The Freedom of the Church in
the Modern Era: Protectingthe Religious Liberty of Religious Institutions, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEG.
Iss. 201 (2013); Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church: Towards an Explanation,
Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEG. Iss. 33 (2013); Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1 Wis. L. REV. 99 (1989); Douglas
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981). My own efforts
include Thomas C. Berg, Progressive Arguments for Religious OrganizationalFreedom, 21 J.
CONTEMP. LEG. ISS. 279 (2013); and Thomas C. Berg, Religious OrganizationalFreedom and
Conditions on Government Benefits, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 165 (2009).
34. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down wage and hour
legislation).
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process doctrine of Lochner barred both states and the federal government
from regulating wages, hours, and other employment conditions in most
industries on the ground that regulation unnecessarily interfered with
freedom of contract.3 5 Although neither of these doctrines was rigidly
laissez-faire, each significantly limited the basic power of government to
regulate employment and other economic activities.
Accommodation, by contrast, allows Congress to regulate generally and
simply declares as-applied exceptions for what is almost always a small
number of cases. With statutory accommodations, of course, the legislature
can calibrate the provision's scope to ensure that it does not undercut a
law's important purposes in general. Additionally with judicial
accommodations under a constitutional provision or a federal or state
RFRA, the typical governing test allows the courts to tailor their relief to
the religious freedom claimant and avoid undercutting regulation broadly.
Under the federal RFRA, the government must show that the "application
of [the law] to [the particular] person" in question, if it burdens his or her
religious exercise, furthers a "compelling governmental interest" and does
so by the "least restrictive means."3 6 This entails, as the Supreme Court has
unanimously emphasized in interpreting the statute, that courts must "look
beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of
government mandates" and instead must "scrutinize[e] the asserted harm of

granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants"-since a
particularized exemption is all that the court will be ordering.3 7 "[I]n other
words, [courts must] look to the marginal interest in enforcing" the law in
the particular case and others like it.3 8 By examining government interests,
and ordering relief at the margin of the law in dispute rather than at its core,
the court can preserve most laws' core purposes while also protecting
religious freedom.
B. Accommodation Can Set PracticalBalances

Second, accommodation works out the tension between regulation and
religious freedom in a pragmatic way, according to the circumstances of the
conflict in question. This is especially true with specific statutory
accommodations, which reflect the legislature's weighing of the interests in
a variety of contexts, but it is true even for the overarching approaches

35. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down state maximumhours legislation in the general range of industries); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525
(1923) (striking down congressional minimum-wage legislation for the District of Columbia, on
grounds equally applicable to state laws).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (1993).
37. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006);
accord Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
38.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779.
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reflected in general legal standards like the compelling-interest test. That
test creates a presumption against imposing substantial burdens on religious
exercise but allows the government to overcome the presumption through a
strong showing. When Congress restored the compelling-interest standard
in 1993 through RFRA, it declared it to be "a workable test for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests."39
Religious-liberty defenders should certainly push for accommodations;
but progressive proponents of legislation should be open to them too.
Pragmatic adjustments are part of the classical progressive attitude toward
government. The original progressive movement of the early 20th century
was characterized, according to one leading scholar, by "optimism,
idealism, pragmatic experimentation, and a willingness to work across party
lines" to balance competing social goals.4 0 It makes sense to do the same for
religious freedom when it conflicts with the legitimate goals of welfare
regulation.
C. The Scope and Contours ofAccommodation
Finally, there are various specific challenges to the idea of religious
accommodation, and responding to them can help define accommodation's
scope and contours.
1. Government Interests at the Margin
First, how can we draw coherent lines between government interests
that override religious freedom and those that do not? An initial pragmatic
answer is that the government's interest must be measured by the cost of
accommodating the objector and others like him, not the cost of
undermining the law in question as a whole. Again, RFRA embodies this
principle explicitly: it requires the government to prove a compelling
interest justifying "the application of the burden [on religious exercise] to
the person," not a compelling interest justifying the law as a whole.4 1 To
reiterate, RFRA's test "look[s] beyond broadly formulated interests
justifying the general applicability of government mandates and
scrutinize[s] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular
religious claimants."4 2 Applying this focus on harms at the margin, the
Court held that RFRA protected a small sect's use of a hallucinogenic tea in

39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (1993).
40. Elizabeth Sanders, Rediscovering the Progressive Era, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1281, 1282
(2011); see also Kenneth I. Kersch, Justice Breyer's Mandarin Liberty, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 759,
768 & n.26 (2006) (describing pragmatism as "a major influence on early twentieth century
progressives").
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
42. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 431.

180 UNIV OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VIII

its worship services, because even though abuse of the hallucinogenic drug
was likely dangerous, the government had not proven that the sect's limited
sacramental use would cause such harm, or that it would lead to trafficking
in the drug.4 3 Likewise, in the Yoder decision-one of the model cases for
RFRA-the Court found that education in general was an important interest

but that its fundamental purposes did not require forcing the Amish to send
their children to school after age 14.4
2. Government Interests and Alternative Means

Of course, even after narrowing the harm in question to that caused by
the objector and others like him, we still must decide the seriousness of that
harm. In some cases, accommodating religious conscience may be possible
if-and only if-the government interest is defined modestly rather than
stringently. Consider, for example, whether the government may compel
Catholic Charities to place children with same-sex couples in violation of
its religious beliefs. If the relevant compelling purpose of antidiscrimination law is to ensure that same-sex couples have ample ability to
adopt children, then accommodating Catholic Charities creates no problem,
because the evidence typically shows that many other agencies will do
same-sex placements.4 5 Likewise, when one wedding photographer declines
to shoot a same-sex ceremony, the couple almost always can go to the very
next photographer in the directory.4 6 The interest in overall access to
services need not clash with adherence to religious tenets. On this ground,
for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied the state
summary judgment in a civil action against a landlord who refused to rent
to an unmarried, cohabiting opposite-sex couple. The court said:
We have no indication, beyond the facts of this case, whether the rental
housing policies of people such as the defendants can be accommodated ...
without significantly impeding the availability of rental housing for people
who are cohabiting or wish to cohabit. Market forces often tend to
discourage owners from restricting the class of people to whom they would

43. Id. at 436-37 (accepting the district court's findings on these points).
44. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213, 221.
45. See Dale Carpenter, Let Catholics Discriminate, METROWEEKLY (Mar. 29, 2006),
http://www.indegayforum.org/news/show/27350.html ("Gay couples could still adopt through
dozens of other private agencies or through the state child-welfare services department itself,
which places most adoptions in the state.").
46.
In Elane Photography, supra, the record showed no costs incurred by the lesbian couple
in finding another photographer, and the couple did not seek monetary damages. Elane

Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 433 (N.M.Ct. App. 2012). The state human-rights
commission ordered the photographer to pay $6,600-plus to the couple for attorney's fees and
costs, an award the couple later waived, Elane Photography LLC v. Willocks, 309 P.3d 53, 60

(N.M. 2013).
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rent.4 7
To restate this argument in terms of the test of RFRA and similar state
statutes: the interest in overall access does not provide a compelling reason
to penalize an individual provider if ample alternative providers are
available; and relying on those alternatives is a least restrictive means of
satisfying the interest in access.
On the other hand, the clash between anti-discrimination laws and
adherence to religious tenets is unavoidable if the government has a
compelling interest in preventing each and every act of discrimination.
There is no alternative means to satisfy that interest other than to penalize
each objector. Some courts have accepted this definition of the government
interest. The Alaska Supreme Court, for example, ruled against a small
landlord who refused to rent to unmarried couples, on the ground that the
state had a compelling "transactional interest in preventing discrimination
based on irrelevant characteristics," regardless of whether the refusal
materially impeded the couple's access:
The government views acts of discrimination as independent social
evils even if the prospective tenants ultimately find housing. Allowing
housing discrimination that degrades individuals, affronts human dignity,
and limits one's opportunities results in harming the government's
transactional interest in preventing such discrimination.48
This stricter reading of the interest behind anti-discrimination lawsthe transactional interest-does put such laws in unavoidable conflict with
the religious conscience of providers. By contrast, the more modest but still
significant reading-which emphasizes simply ensuring ample "access" to
services-enables anti-discrimination law and religious freedom to co-exist.
To describe these two interests underlying anti-discrimination law is
not to choose which should apply in a given setting. We might conclude
that the transactional approach should apply in some settings but the accessfocused approach should apply in others. Perhaps, for example, the forprofit marketplace must be free from discrimination in each transaction,
because it is especially important to ensure everyone's participation in
economic life and to prevent refusals that may foment misunderstanding
and resentment. Even if that is true, it would not necessarily extend to
override claims by religious non-profit organizations when they lack the
market power to harm the access interest (as was the case with Catholic
Charities' adoption services).
In my view, the transactional approach should control in most
commercial anti-discrimination cases, but in a small category of
commercial cases, the focus should be on whether access remains readily

47.
48.

Att'y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (1994).
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282-83 (1994).
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available. That small category involves cases where the religious objector's
interest is most direct and personal and therefore anti-discrimination
liability would impose the most serious burden. Those are cases of sole
proprietors or small-business owners providing personal services to
facilitate, in a direct and focused way, a ceremony or relationship to which
they object: the wedding photographer and the marriage counselor. These
objectors plausibly feel the most direct personal responsibility for their
contribution to others' actions. To require them to act in violation of their
religious tenets on the basis of a "transactional interest" in preventing every
instance of discrimination would not give religious freedom the weight it
deserves. It is true that same-sex couples may experience offense,
resentment, or jarring at a single provider's discriminatory refusal, even if
there are ample alternative providers of the direct personal service in
questions. Without denying the reality of that harm, however, we must-in
order to balance rights-compare it with the harm suffered by the provider
who would be forced by law either to violate his conscience, by directly
supporting behavior he believes sinful, or pay fines or damage awards that,
as they aggregate, may drive him from his business.4 9 That harm is more
serious, both in reality and in our constitutional tradition.
This approach is most consistent with the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Hobby Lobby. There the majority was quite firm in holding that
RFRA gives serious weight to religious-freedom rights and that the statute's
protections extends to for-profit businesses as well as religious institutions
and individuals. The majority reasoned that "RFRA was designed to
provide very broad protection for religious liberty"; and it doubted "that the
Congress that enacted such sweeping protection put small-business owners
to the choice" of either foregoing religious-freedom protection or foregoing
use of the corporate form.so For reasons detailed at greater length elsewhere,
such protection is warranted not only by the statute but also by the
importance and constitutional weight of the believer's interest in following
his or her faith in all aspects of life."

49. Although the lesbian couple in Elane Photography waved the $6,600-plus award
assessed against the photographer (according to the New Mexico Supreme Court, 309 P.3d at 60),
there is of course no guarantee that the same will happen in other cases.
50. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767.
51. See, e.g., id. at 2767-75; Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty
for Moneymakers, 21 GEO. MASON L. REv. 59 (2013); for my own views, see Welfare State,
supra note 1, at 113-20. The Hobby Lobby Court also rightly noted the connection between
recognizing businesses' religious-freedom rights and affirming the premises of corporate social
responsibility. See 134 S. Ct. at 2771 ("For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support
a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further
humanitarian and other altruistic objectives. . . . [T]here is no apparent reason why they may not
further religious objectives as well." and noting that more and more states are recognizing the
corporation as, the "dual-purpose entity that seeks to achieve both a benefit for the public and a
profit for its owners").
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At the same time, the holding in Hobby Lobby is also limited. After
firmly establishing that the closely-held companies in the case could sue
under RFRA, the majority proceeded cautiously in assessing whether the
mandate served a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive
means. Justice Alito's majority opinion raised questions about whether the
mandate served a compelling interest, given various exceptions it already
recognized.5 2 However, in the end, the majority opinion avoided those
questions and relied on the fact that the government already had a means for
providing contraceptive coverage without employer subsidies or
involvement: the so-called "non-profit accommodation" by which a
religiously affiliated charity's insurer would provide the coverage itself in a
separate policy. The majority found "no reason why this accommodation
would fail to protect the asserted needs of women as effectively as the
contraceptive mandate." 5 3
Justice Kennedy, the crucial fifth vote, joined the majority opinion but
also wrote a concurrence making even more clear his reliance on the
"existing, recognized, workable, and already-implemented" non-profit
accommodation, which he said "equally furthers the Government's interest
but does not impinge on the plaintiffs' religious beliefs."5 4 While the
majority opinion contained language suggesting that a new government
funding program would also count as an available means," Kennedy
showed skepticism about that option, describing it as the "imposition of a
whole new program or burden on the Government."56
The overall message from Hobby Lobby, especially considering
Kennedy's key opinion, is that for-profit businesses can challenge
commercial regulations that force them to violate their faith, and they will
sometimes succeed, but only in a quite limited class of cases.5 7 For two
special reasons, the contraceptive-coverage
accommodation easily
constituted a less restrictive means, and it made sense to extend it even to a
large business like Hobby Lobby. First, the legal objection in the case was
not over women receiving free or subsidized contraception, but rather over
who would pay for it. The companies did not challenge the government's

52. 134 S. Ct. at 2779-82.
53. Id. at 2782.
54. Id. at 2786.
55. Id. at 2780-81.
56. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. As two opponents of Hobby Lobby put it, "the fulcrum on which this case turns-the
ability of government to satisfy both religious interests and the competing concerns of employees
and their dependents-suggests that .. . Hobby Lobby is not nearly so sweeping or radical as it
may seem." Ira Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Hobby Lobby in the Long Run, CORNERSTONE BLOG (July
1,
2014),
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/cornerstone/hobby-lobby-the-ruling-and-itsimplications-for-religious-freedom/responses/hobby-lobby-in-the-long-run.

184 UNIV OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VIII

power to subsidize contraceptives itself." As Vikram Amar and Alan
Brownstein put it, writing before the Hobby Lobby decision, "[t]he benefits
provided by the Act-generally available and affordable health insuranceare fungible, intangible goods that can be provided by either the public or
private sector, . . . [a]nd the Act's beneficiaries have no reason to care about
the source of the insurance."5 9
In addition, insurers could cover contraception without premiums-the
solution employed for the non-profit accommodation-because, by the
government's own calculations, the "costs of providing contraceptive
coverage are balanced by cost savings from lower pregnancy-related costs
and from improvements in women's health." 6 0 If insurers of religious nonprofits could thus afford it, so it seems can insurers of for-profits. Likewise,
the government had already determined that third-party administrators of
self-insured religious non-profits' plans could, with a few adjustments, pay
to cover those employees; again, the same dynamic would seem to work for
self-insured for-profits.6 1 Given these unusual features of contraceptive
coverage, however, Hobby Lobby provides little or no ground for thinking
that 13,000-employee businesses will prevail in other cases lacking such
features.6 2

[a]

In short, RFRA worked as Congress intended. It led the Court to "strike
sensible balanc[e] between religious liberty and competing

58. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (No. 13-354, 2013), WL 5720377, at *35 (arguing that government "did not explain why it
could not use [Title X funding program] to redress genuine economic barriers to contraceptive
access").
59. Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, The Narrow (and Proper) Way for the
Court to Rule in Hobby Lobby's Favor, VERDICT (Apr. 11, 2014),
http://verdict.justia.com/2014/04/1 1/narrow-proper-way-court-rule-hobby-lobbys-favor. Amar and
Brownstein urged the Court to rule on precisely the ground that (most narrowly read) it did: the
ability to extend the non-profit accommodation.
60. Final Rules, Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 39870, 39877 (July 2, 2013) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590) (quoted in Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763); id. at 39870-72 (finding that "[c]overing contraceptives ... yields
significant cost savings ... after accounting for both the direct medical costs of pregnancy and the
indirect costs, such as employee absence," and therefore that adding contraceptive coverage does
not increase premiums).
61. Id.
62. Some religious non-profits have objected to the insurer-pays accommodation itself,
making a variety of arguments that it still renders them complicit in the insurers' provision of
abortifacients or contraceptives. After fighting these challenges for a while, the government
ultimately adopted properly, in my view-a new form allowing non-profits to give notice of
their objection without specifically designating the insurer to provide the coverage. See Mary
Agnes Carey, FAQ: Administration's New Contraception Rules Explained, MEDSCAPE
MULTISPECIALTY (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2013/february/
01/faq-contraception-mandate-and-religious-employers.aspxform; see also Wheaton College v.
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) (entering temporary stay ordering use of similar process for nonprofit objectors). For reasons detailed elsewhere, I believe some such simplified notice procedure
is likely to satisfy RFRA. See Welfare State, supra note 31, at 26, n. 116.
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[g]overnmental interests" 6 3-requiring the government to respect both by
using the alternative mechanism of payment by insurers and third-party
administrators. Without RFRA and its requirement of accommodation, the
Court would have had no authority to push the government toward that
ready alternative.
It is somewhat more complex to apply Hobby Lobby's analysis to other
controversial exemption cases, for example when religious non-profits or
religiously devout individuals-the Catholic adoption agency, the
evangelical wedding photographer-decline to provide services they
believe will be directly facilitating sin. Unlike with the insurer-pays
contraception accommodation, exemptions from anti-discrimination laws
create some costs for the laws' beneficiaries-even if the material cost is
only that of calling the next provider in the phone directory. The case for
exemption is strongest where the material costs to beneficiaries are quite
small because any alternative provider is readily available (many other
wedding photographers, many other adoption agencies). In such instances,
accommodating the objector best serves the goal of enabling both sides to
live consistently with their identities and deep commitments. It gives
significant weight to religious freedom while also preserving access for
same-sex couples.
However, if exemptions in the commercial sphere were to expand
significantly, they would indeed impose substantial costs on same-sex
couples. Thus, the argument for exempting the small wedding photographer
does not justify exemption for a larger business, or for an objector who does
not provide direct personal services; expanding accommodation to these
categories would greatly increase the potential threat to access. The
wedding photographer and florist also object to providing a service to a
particular discrete event, the marriage ceremony, which they regard as
sacramental or at least of great religious significance. Exempting them
would not justify exempting other providers who refuse to deal with samesex couples altogether.
Much more could be said concerning the precise balance in any given
case between religious freedom and the interests of others and society. My
point here is simply that we have ample conceptual resources for striking
that balance in sophisticated and context-sensitive ways.
It is true, however, that giving any protection to the wedding
photographer requires focusing on whether the denial of service in such
cases materially affects customers' access to services in real terms. In turn,
focusing on real-world access requires placing some reliance on the
economic market to ensure the customer's access through other providers.
We can rely on the market, the pro-accommodation argument goes, because

63.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5)
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businesses-and charities, one could add-generally want to offer, not
deny, services to interested customers, especially paying customers. Thus,
the argument continues, the interest in access requires overriding religious
freedom only when the objectors hold market power. The Massachusetts
court relied on this logic in its case ruling for the landlord against the
unmarried couple.
Thus, drawing a line that makes meaningful accommodation for
religious freedom sometimes requires accepting market logic and rejecting
the premise that every application of welfare-state regulation is necessary.
Judges and legislators who are skeptical of market-based solutions are
likely to reject this logic. To that extent, religious freedom and the premises
of the welfare state conflict.
Nevertheless, this use of market logic is a far cry from rejecting the
underlying welfare-state law altogether. The law remains in place in the
vast majority of cases; the accommodation claim does not challenge that.
Additionally, the market logic does not enter for its own sake, to promote a
general libertarian or market-based approach to issues of economic
regulation. Critics who attack religious accommodation as a kind of
"market fundamentalism" or "Lochner-izing"65 wildly overstate their case.
In arguments for religious accommodation, market logic serves simply as
an instrument to strike the balance between the human, non-economic
values of religious freedom and non-discrimination.
In the cases discussed involving denials of service by adoption agencies
or wedding photographers, the interest in others' ready access to services
can be satisfied by an alternative means that already exists: that is, other,
willing providers. Likewise, in the case of contraceptive coverage, the
government, through the non-profit accommodation, had identified an
alternative provider, the insurer. Sometimes, however, the government itself
can easily provide or support access. For example, in the Hobby Lobby
dispute, the government could have expanding the existing Title X program
of free contraception, or by using subsidize or tax incentives to encourage
private manufacturers and distributors to do it. 6 6 By these mechanisms, the

64. See Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (1994)
65. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism (June 3, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law and Gender); Nina Totenberg, Rare
Unanimity in Supreme Court Term, With Plenty ofFireworks, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (July 6, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/2014/07/06/329235293/
rare-unanimity-in-supreme-court-term-with-plenty-of-fireworks
(statement from constitutional
scholar Akhil Amar describing Hobby Lobby and other decisions as "the new Lochner"). In recent
constitutional discourse, to "Lochner-ize" is to treat (erroneously) the economic market and the
common-law rules of property and contract as the natural, pre-political order and interpret the
Constitution accordingly, as the Court did in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Cass
R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
66. See, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 686 (7th Cir. 2013) (arguing that "[t]he
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government would take the impact of an employer's religious-freedom
rights-the refusal to provide mandated contraception-and spread it from
the relatively small number of employees directly affected to a much larger
group, the overall taxpaying public..67 As Alan Brownstein has argued, in
general such measures answer the objection that is unfair to shift the costs
of religious exercise to other specific individuals.6 8 Moreover, when the
general public bears the costs, "the balancing analysis in free exercise cases
is more appropriately analogized to the kinds of judicial balancing that
occurs" in, for example, free speech cases, where the public bears costs
such as the security measures necessary to protect unpopular speakers from
angry crowds.69
The government-funding mechanism would work even if contraception
coverage involved net costs for provider: the government would simply
bear the costs, spreading them widely over the general population to avoid
burdening anyone significantly. Cost spreading through government will
not work in all situations; obviously, for example, there is no mechanism
for the government to compensate individual discrimination plaintiffs. Even
in Hobby Lobby, Justice Kennedy in his crucial concurring opinion spoke
negatively of the alternative of new government spending on contraception,
perhaps because he saw no chance that such a program would pass. 0 But in
some cases, government funding is one of the alternative means that
government must consider in accomplishing its goals.
A final alternative means of satisfying the government's interest is to
impose an alternative duty on the religious objector, one to which she does
not object. In the HHS dispute, the government could require an employer
who excludes contraception to pay employees an actuarially equivalent
salary supplement, which each employee could use for any purpose
including buying contraception. Assuming that employers have no
objection to employees using salaries for contraception-and the plaintiffemployers indicated no such objection-this alternative inserts a duty
consistent with the employer's conscience to replace the duty that
conflicted. Alternative duties are often, although not always, realistic "less

government can provide a 'public option' for contraception insurance; it can give tax incentives to
contraception suppliers to provide these medications and services at no cost to consumers; it can
give tax incentives to consumers of contraception and sterilization services," and that "[n]o doubt
there are other options").
67. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781-82 (2014).
68. Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 55,
128-29 (2006).
69. Id.
70. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing new government
spending as the "imposition of a whole new program or burden on the Government" and adding
that "[t]he Court properly does not resolve whether one freedom should be protected by creating
incentives for additional government constraints."
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restrictive means" for accomplishing the government's objective.
3. Accommodation and the Rights of Others

Opponents of accommodation in a given case often argue that the
religious conduct in question cannot be protected because it imposes on the
rights of specific individuals. In this formulation, there is not merely a
government interest to be balanced against religious freedom; there is an
individual right that absolutely limits religious freedom. After all, no one
would assert that a religious believer has a free exercise right to kill another
human being or steal another's property. Thus, the argument goes,
whenever religious conduct infringes on a legal right of another person, it
falls outside the scope of religious freedom. In its stronger form, the
argument is that an accommodation allowing harm to others' legal rights
violates the Establishment Clause. For example, several scholars, in articles
and amicus briefs, argued that to exempt businesses from the contraception
mandate would be unconstitutional because it would harm employees by
denying them the valuable statutory benefit of free contraception
coverage.7 1 At the very least, opponents might assert that accommodations
that harm others cannot be required under religious-freedom statutes, like
RFRA, or state constitutional provisions that require exemptions. The
government made this argument in Hobby Lobby, while refraining from
asserting that an exemption would violate the Establishment Clause.7 2
It may seem right, on first glance, to say simply that religious freedom
does not authorize one person to harm or shift costs to another. As Eugene
Volokh has observed, "religious freedom rights are often articulated as a
right to do what your religion motivates you to do, simply because of your
religious motivation, but only so long as it doesn't harm the rights of

others."7 3 But the problem comes in defining terms like "harms" to "the
rights of others." In an earlier era of smaller government, legal prohibitions
generally focused on a limited set of direct harms to another's body,
physical or financial property, or contractual rights. This framework
certainly restricted the harms that religiously motivated conduct, like nonreligiously motivated conduct, could impose on others. No one was free to
commit assault, theft, or fraud, even if he did so for religious reasons.
The rise of the welfare-regulatory state has changed this. The active

71. See Gedicks, supra note 25, at 52; Micah Schwartzman et al., Hobby Lobby and the
Establishment Clause, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 9, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobbylobby-and-establishment-clause_9.htmlhtml (and other posts linked there).
72. See Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 985085, at *4.
73. Eugene Volokh, Hobby Lobby, the Employer Mandate, and Religious Exemptions, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 46-47 (Dec. 2, 2013, 12:40 AM), http://www.volokh.com/category/hobbylobby/ (click on "my Hobby Lobby posts in a single Word document").
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state declares previously unrecognized legal harms. At-will employment
has given way to extensive regulation of the employment relationship; the
government declares it a legal harm when an employee is barred from
unionizing or is discriminated against based on a prohibited factor.
Businesses' freedom to deal or not deal with others has given way to
increasingly wide-ranging public accommodations laws declaring
discrimination in the provision of almost any good or service to be a legal
harm. 4 A keystone of modern constitutional jurisprudence is that
government has broad prima facie power to define, declare, and prohibit
these harms.
I have analyzed this problem in greater detail elsewhere;7 5 here, I only
give a sketch of analysis. Religious accommodation cannot and does not
seek to undo government's power to declare new legal rights and harms. At
the same time, however, if religious freedom confers no right to harm
others, and the legislature can define anything it wishes as a harm, then the
regulatory state will severely constrict religious freedom. For example, once
civil rights laws defined various forms of discrimination as a legal harm to
employees, religious organizations faced lawsuits challenging their
decisions concerning their clergy and other leaders. Religious organizations
retained their ability to choose their leaders, free from second-guessing by
civil courts, only because of a court-ordered religious accommodation: the
ministerial exception, affirmed in Hosanna v. Tabor.7 6
The Hobby Lobby majority addressed this issue in responding to the
government's argument that RFRA should never be interpreted so as to
withhold a statutory benefit from third parties. The question of effects on
others, the Court recognized, "will often inform the analysis of the
Government's compelling interest and the availability of a less restrictive
means" of advancing it.77 But the Court went on to emphasize:
[I]t could not be reasonably maintained that any burden on religious
exercise, no matter how onerous and no matter how readily the government
interest could be achieved through alternative means, is permissible under
RFRA so long as the relevant legal obligation requires the religious
adherent to confer a benefit on third parties. [If that were so, then by]
framing any Government regulation as benefiting a third party, the
Government could turn all regulations into entitlements to which nobody
74. See, Muehlmeyer, supra note 4; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625-26
(1984); Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 1251; tit. 25, §§ 1402, 1401(1); Elane Photography, LLC v.
Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2012); Unruh § 51, and accompanying text (noting the expansion
of public-accommodation laws).
75. See Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, supra note 1, at 130-42
(discussing harms that warrant limiting religious freedom); id. at 142-47 (discussing
Establishment Clause limits on accommodations).
76. 132 S. Ct. 694, 696 (2012).
77. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014).
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could object on religious grounds, rendering RFRA meaningless.7 8
The Court cited several examples of how any regulation could be recast
as a benefit to other individuals: a Muslim-owned store could be required to
sell alcohol in order that its customers might benefit; a restaurant owner
could be required to stay open on his Sabbath so employees of other faiths
could earn wages and tips.79 It is easy to multiply examples of
accommodations that affect third parties and yet are at least constitutionally
permissible, whether or not mandated by RFRA. Draft exemptions "shift
harm" from the pacifist to another person who must be drafted; the clergypenitent privilege may shift harm to the crime or tort victim who may lose
the benefit of testimony. 0 In unemployment cases, like Sherbert v. Verner,
a former worker's claim for benefits increases an employer's rate of
assessment for unemployment taxes." A religious ministry that feeds or
shelters the homeless could be said to affect neighboring property owners. 82
Religious-freedom claims nevertheless have prevailed, and should prevail,
in many of these cases. The state should not be able merely to invoke some
effects on other individuals in order to refuse accommodation; it should
have to make a stronger showing.
Religious accommodation offers the means to mediate between the
expanded state and the free exercise of religion-to affirm the legitimacy of
the former while preserving room for the latter. If we are to affirm the
legitimacy of the welfare state, we cannot say that only historic commonlaw, libertarian harms-physical force, theft, or fraud-are cognizable
grounds for overriding religious freedom. On the other hand, to preserve the
importance of religious freedom in the welfare state, there must be some
limits on what can count as a harm to others that justifies limiting religious
freedom.
For a general standard to resolve this problem, I believe the best
available formulation is that substantial restrictions on religious practices
should be relieved unless the government interest in the situation is quite
strong-"compelling," in RFRA's terms-and no less restrictive means can

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Volokh, Hobby Lobby, supra note 71, at 25-27 ("I don't know of any court that has
taken the view that applying the clergy-congregant exemption from the duty to testify in [the
victim's] case would violate the Establishment Clause violation, despite the likely burden this
would impose on [the victim]. . . . [I]t seems pretty well-settled that the exemptions are
constitutionally permissible, notwithstanding these burdens").
81. See, e.g., Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 25, at 1513-14, n.154
("Unemployment compensation is generally experience-rated, so an employer's unemployment
tax payments are tied to the number of claims the employer has had to pay out.")
82. See Chosen 300 Ministries v. City of Philadelphia, 2012 WL 3235317 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(holding that Pennsylvania's RFRA prevented city from barring religious organizations from
serving homeless in city park).
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be adopted without significantly compromising the government's interest.
This is the standard of RFRAs, but it also provides a guide for legislatures
to enact specific statutory accommodations. It is "a balancing test," but
"with the thumb on the scale in favor of protecting constitutional rights."8 3
More specifically, in conducting the balance, courts or legislatures
should consider several factors: (1) the immediacy and severity of the harm;
(2) the nature of the claimant (for example, for-profit versus non-profit
entity) and the claimant's harm; (3) the likelihood that the harm to others
will repeat and accumulate; and (4) the availability of less restrictive means
to prevent the harm.8 4 Applying these considerations permits courts and
legislatures to calibrate balances, sensitive to context, between religious
freedom and other serious competing interests.
4. Alternative Burdens on the Objector as a Check on "Privilege"
Finally, as mentioned above, government can sometimes satisfy its
interest without infringing religious freedom by holding the objector to an
alternative obligation that does not conflict with his conscience." Imposing
an alternative obligation can also mitigate another problem with
accommodations: the danger that the accommodated party will receive an
unfair privilege or competitive advantage over others.
If the
accommodation is attractive in terms of secular self-interest, it can create
such a privilege, and also trigger related problems: a profusion of claims,
including even insincere claims. To reduce these problems, alternative
burdens have been used in a number of accommodation situations, most
notably the requirement of alternative service for conscientious objectors to
the military draft.8 6 "[The conditioning of exemptions on steps that mitigate
or eliminate the secular value of the exemption," in the significant number
of cases where this is possible, "will make sham claims for exemptions
considerably less attractive."87
In the contraception-coverage case itself, the problem of insincere or
self-interested exemptions was minimal. As already noted, the government

83.
Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemptions Debate, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIG. 139,
151-52 (2009). Even strict scrutiny will permit many applications of general laws to religious
practice-unlike its results in free speech, racial discrimination, and even religious discrimination
cases, where it nearly always invalidates the law. See Adam Winker, Fatalin Theory and Strict in
Fact:An EmpiricalAnalysis ofStrict Scrutiny in the FederalCourts, 50 VAND. L. REV. 793, 86162 (2006).
84. See Berg, Religious Accommodation in the Welfare State, supra note 1, at 134-42.
85. See supra text following note 72.
86. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1017-18 (1990) (endorsing like alternative service for draft
objector as an example of a practical means of minimizing incentives to claim insincere or selfinterested exemptions).
87. Brownstein, supra note 67, at 133.
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itself determined that employers who exclude contraception end up
incurring greater healthcare costs overall." However, that with some other
procedures, employers might have an incentive to object to coverage in
order to secure lower insurance premiums. An alternative burden, to reduce
that incentive, would be to require the objecting employer to provide an
actuarially equivalent amount of coverage for other procedures (or
alternatively a salary supplement). This solution formed part of the Health
Care Conscience Rights Act, a bill proposed in Congress and supported by
the Catholic bishops as a response to the insurance-coverage controversy. 89
The bill would have protected objectors from having to provide or purchase
insurance covering objectionable procedures, but it explicitly preserved the
government's ability to issue regulations or other guidance to ensure that
health insurance coverage or group health plans excluding abortion or other
items or services under this section shall have an "aggregate actuarial value
at least equivalent to that of health insurance coverage or group health plans
at the same level of coverage that do not exclude such items or services."90
CONCLUSION

All of these accommodation devices I have discussed raise further
questions, and it requires judgment for a court or legislature to decide when
and how to apply them. They cannot eliminate the tension between welfarestate regulation and religious freedom. On the one hand, the increasing
complexity of society does sometimes warrant generally applicable
regulation that limits religious practice as well. Conversely, there may be a
few situations where regulation threatens important religious-freedom
values and the only realistic way to protect religious freedom is to defeat or
repeal the regulation entirely.
But for defenders of religious freedom, placing all the chips on
defeating regulation is a very risky play. If the effort fails and the law is
passed, the chance to secure meaningful accommodations has usually
passed by. With same-sex marriage, in particular, the long-term odds of
defeating it are now vanishingly small, given the rapid changes in both
public opinion 91 and judicial attitudes: as of this writing, in early 2015, the

88. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text; Final Rules, supra note 47, at 39872
(detailing arguments that "[c]overing contraceptives ... yields significant cost savings").
89. Health Care Conscience Rights Act, S. 1204, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced June 20,
2013); H.R. 940, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Mar. 4, 2013).
90. S. 1204, § 3(a)(3) (adding new § 1566 to the Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148);
H.R. 940, § 3(a)(3) (same).
91. For example, research from the Pew Research Center has shown that "[tihe rise in
support for same-sex marriage over the past decade is among the largest changes in opinion on
any policy issue over this time period" (reaching 51 percent by May 2013) Gay Marriage:Key
Data Points from Pew Research, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 11, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/gay-marriage-key-data-points-from-pew-research/.
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Supreme Court seemed poised to declare a constitutional right to marriage
equality.9 2 Increasingly, to protect religious freedom, accommodation will
be the only game in town.
Finally, to reiterate my main point about accommodation: there are
almost always coherent ways to avoid or significantly reduce burdens on
religious freedom without seriously compromising important government
interests. Courts and legislatures will only undertake this task if they treat
religious freedom as a weighty interest. The real questions, then, are
whether our society will take religious freedom seriously, and how to
convince it to do so. Those are big questions, for other papers.9 3

Even those opposed to same-sex marriage now expect, by a decisive margin (59 percent), that it is
inevitable. Id. Millennials, born 1981 or later, are 14 percentage points more likely to favor samesex marriage rights than Generation X members, born 1965-80 (66 percent versus 52 percent) and
25 percentage points percent more likely than baby boomers, born 1946-64 (66 versus 41
percent). Id.
92. Since the Court invalidated part of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013),
there has been a nearly unbroken string of 47 rulings in 46 cases from 28 different federal courts
that have held the laws of 28 states that barred same-sex couples from marrying or having their
marriages recognized to be unconstitutional or that have entered partial or full injunctions against
them (AL, AK, AR, AZ, CO, FL, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, MI, MS, MT, NV, NC, OH, OK, OR, PA,
SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI, and WY). Including state courts, the total rises to 63 rulings in 59
cases from 42 different federal and state courts invalidating or enjoining the enforcement of the
marriage bans of 31 states (the states in the last parenthetical, plus MO, NJ, and NM).
Pending Marriage Equality Cases, LAMBDA LEGAL (emphasis in original) (last visited Apr. 15,
2015), http://www.lambdalegal.org/pending-marriage-equality-cases.
93. See sources cited supra in notes 33-34.

